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On March 22nd 2006, the House of Lords allowed an appeal by the 
defendant school, Denbigh High School in Luton and ruled that the school’s 
uniform policy which disallowed a particular variation of Islamic dress - the 
“jilbab” (a long sleeved floor length loose fitting tunic dress) - did not amount 
to an interference with the respondent’s right to manifest her religion.1 
Denbigh High School’s, school uniform, for those who were of the Islamic 
faith was in the form of the “shalwar kameeze” (a tunic and a particular style 
of shaped trousers). This uniform variation was worn by those Muslim girls 
who wished to wear it and was also worn by non-Muslim girls of Hindu and 
Sikh faiths who attended the school. Shabina Begum had attended the school 
since the age of eleven years and had worn the shalwar kameeze. When she 
was thirteen she no longer wished to wear the shalwar kameeze, instead she 
said she wanted to wear a jilbab which she maintained was  “the appropriate” 
dress code for a Muslim woman after puberty. Moreover, she refused to attend 
school unless she could wear this form of dress. 
The facts are set out in the House of Lords judgement: “On 3 September 
2002, the first day of the autumn term, the respondent (then aged nearly 14 
years) went to the school with her brother and another young man. They asked 
to speak to the head teacher, who was not available, and they spoke to the 
assistant head teacher, Mr Moore. They insisted that the respondent be 
 
* BA (CNAA ), MA , PhD (Manc), LLM (Reading), Professor of Law, Deputy Dean 
of Law, University of Buckingham; Barrister, (Door Tenant) Clarendon Chambers 1 
Plowden Buildings Temple, London EC4Y 9BU. 
1 R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School HL [2006] UKHL 15, [2006] All ER (D) 320 (Mar), (Approved judgment). 
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allowed to attend the school wearing the long garment she had on that day, 
which was a long coat-like garment known as a jilbab.”2  
The school refused to allow her to attend unless she wore either the 
regular school uniform or the shalwar kameeze,  and in December 2002, the 
school together with the Local Education Authority sought independent 
advice from Muslim experts regarding whether the shalwar kameeze as a 
variation of the school uniform ‘offended’ against the Islamic dress code. Two 
mosques in Luton, the London Central Mosque Trust and the Islamic Cultural 
Centre advised that the shalwar kameeze did not offend and conformed with 
the Islamic dress code. 
On behalf of Shabina Begum opinions were sought from three sources 
(two of these were Imams who had been previously consulted by Denbigh 
High School) on the merits of the jilbab. They all maintained that the jilbab 
was “the appropriate dress for mature Muslim women.”3 This information 
was passed on to the appellants, who refused to accept that this was “the 
appropriate” dress for women, and in September 2003 the Education Welfare 
Service offered to help her find a place at another school if that was what she 
wanted. In the same month, the school received a statement made by the 
Muslim Council of Britain on the “Dress code for women in Islam” which 
stated “there was no recommended style; modesty must be observed at all 
times; trousers with long tops or shirts for school wear were ‘absolutely 
fine’.”4 
Shabina Begum felt that she was being effectively excluded by not being 
allowed to attend school dressed in the jilbab, whilst the school, on the other 
hand, considered that they were not excluding her since a school place was 
available if she wore the shalwar kameeze. In October 2003, a committee of 
the school governors met and gave a lengthy decision upholding the head 
teacher's decision which required her to wear the school uniform or the 
prescribed variation of it. 
 
THE HIGH COURT 
 
Shabina Begum, issued her claim for judicial review on  February 13, 
2004 for leave first, to challenge the decision of the head teacher and the 
governors not to her admit if she insisted on wearing the jilbab and second, to 
challenge the consequence of this which was that  Luton Borough Council  
was not providing her with education. Leave was granted but only to 
challenge the decision of the head teacher and governors. Shabina also 
 
2 Ibid per Lord Bingham, at para 10. 
3 Ibid at para 15.   
4 Ibid at para 15. 
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contended that not allowing her to wear her preferred form of Islamic dress 
amounted to excluding her from school, and contravened article 9(1) of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998). 
Article 9 asserts: 
 
 “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. 
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”  
 
She argued that by not being allowed to wear the jilbab in school violated 
her right not to be denied education under art 2 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention, which states: “No person shall be denied the right to education. 
In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and 
to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.” 
Bennett J5 in the High Court held, that there was no breach of article 9(1) 
because “she was excluded for her refusal to wear the school uniform and not 
because of her religious belief.”6 In respect of the limitations Bennett J held, 
“in my judgment the school uniform policy and its enforcement has, and 
continues to have, a legitimate aim and is proportionate.  The legitimate aim 
was the proper running of a multi-cultural, multi-faith, secular school. The 
limitation was also proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”7
In interpretation of art 2 Bennett J was informed by A v Headteacher and 
Governors of Lord Grey School8  (a case which involved the exclusion of 
Abdul Hakim from the Lord Grey School during the pendancy of criminal 
proceedings against him), Stanley Burnton J who heard the A case on transfer 




5 The Times, June 18, 2004, [2004] EWHC 1389. 
6  HL at para 74. 
7  HL at para 91. 
8 [2003] 4 All ER 1317. 
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“…it has to be borne in mind that the duty created by art 2 of 
the First Protocol is imposed on the state, and not on any 
particular domestic institution. It does not create a right to be 
educated in any particular institution or in any particular 
manner. Expulsion from a school of a pupil who has no 
access to alternative educational facilities, such as enrolment 
in another school or education through a pupil referral unit, 
may cause a breach of art 2 of the First Protocol, and if so, the 
school authority may be liable for damages; but if the pupil is 
able to have access to efficient education elsewhere, no 
breach of his convention right will be involved. If the cause 
of the unavailability of alternative efficient education is the 
action or inaction of the local education authority, on whom 
duties are imposed by ss 13 and 19(1) of the 1996 Act, it will 
be the local education authority, rather than the school 
authority, that will have caused the infringement of the pupil's 
rights under art 2 of the First Protocol. If suitable and 
adequate alternative educational facilities are available, but 
the pupil's parents decide that their child should not use them, 
then the local education authority will in general not have 
caused an infringement of art 2 of the First Protocol.”9
 
This argument appears to have been relied upon on by the High Court and 
the House of Lords when they accepted that Shabina Begum had access to 
other schools and was therefore not denied access to education. The High 
Court held that there would be no interference with the right under art 2 of the 
First Protocol unless there had been an exclusion on the grounds of religious 
belief. The court held that the right to be educated meant: “The right to be 
educated, not to be educated at a particular school.”10 Shabina Begum’s claim 
for judicial review against the defendant Denbigh High School was therefore 
dismissed. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The Court of Appeal, (Lord Justices Brooke, Mummery, and Scott 
Baker)11 decided differently from Bennett J in the High Court and made a 
declaration that art 9 had indeed been infringed on the grounds that Shabina 
Begum’s freedom to manifest her religion or belief in public was being 
 
9 Ibid at 1337f, para 83. 
10 Ibid at para 97. 
11 The Times, March 4, 2005; [2005] 1WLR 3372. 
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limited. The Court of Appeal also held differently  on where the burden of 
proof lay. Their view was that the burden rested on the school to justify its 
limitation on her freedom. The Court of Appeal also found that the school had 
excluded her without following the correct procedures. Brooke LJ said: 
 
“The school undoubtedly did exclude the claimant. They told 
her, in effect: 'Go away, and do not come back unless you are 
wearing proper school uniform'. They sent her away for 
disciplinary reasons ... and she was unable to return to the 
school for the same reason.” 12
 
The Court of Appeal elaborated upon what it considered the appropriate 
decision making structure13 (with which the House of Lords disagreed)  which 
started out from the premise, “…that the claimant had a right which is 
recognised by English law, and that the onus lay on the School to justify its 
interference with that right.”14 The Court of Appeal went on to say that if the 
school had approached the issue from the position that the claimant had a 
right under art 9(1) they may well have concluded that interference under art 
9(2) was justified.15 Scott Baker LJ, went on to say, “…there is in my view 
force in the criticism that it is not for the school authorities to pick and choose 
between religious beliefs or shades of religious belief.”16 Mummery LJ said, 
(in contradistinction to Bennett J in the High Court): “It is irrelevant to the 
engagement of article 9 that the claimant could have changed to a school 
which accommodated her religious beliefs about dress.”17 The Court of 
Appeal relied on Kokkinakis v Greece,18 which held that: “Bearing witness in 
words or deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions…”19
 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
The House of Lords  (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott of Foscote, and Baroness Hale of 
Richmond) upheld the decision of Bennett J in the High Court and held that 
art 9(1) the right to hold religious belief was inviolable, and that there had 
been no interference with the right to hold and manifest one’s religion (Lord 
 
12 Ibid  [2005] 3378H-3379A, at para 24.    
13 Ibid per Brooke LJ  3390AB, at para 75. 
14 Ibid per Brooke LJ  3390C, at para 76. 
15 Ibid per Scott Baker LJ  3393CD, at para 92. 
16 Ibid  3393E, at para 93. 
17 Ibid 3391H, at para 84. 
18 (1993) 17 EHRR 397, at paras 31-32. 
19 Ibid. 
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Nicholls of Birkenhead and Baroness Hale of Richmond dissenting). Lord 
Bingham said: 
 
“The fundamental importance of this right in a pluralistic, 
multi-cultural society was clearly explained by my noble and 
learned friend Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in R (Williamson) 
v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 
UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246, paras 15-19, and by the South 
African Constitutional Court in Christian Education South 
Africa v Minister of Education [2001] 1 LRC 441, para 36. 
This is not in doubt. As pointed out by my noble and learned 
friend in para 16 of the passage cited, article 9 protects both 
the right to hold a belief, which is absolute, and a right to 
manifest belief, which is qualified.” 20
 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Baroness Hale of Richmond dissented 
and found that there had been interference with respect to that part of art 9(1) 
– the right to manifest belief - although they held that the limitation of that 
right was justified under art 9(2) “for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.” 
The House of Lords (Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale dissenting) also 
found that art 2 had not been breached because the school’s uniform policy 
was to be obeyed and if the claimant did not like it, she could go to a different 
school.21  Lord Nicholls said:  
 
“Your Lordships' reasons are twofold: (1) the school's refusal 
to allow Shabina Begum to wear a jilbab at school did not 
interfere with her article 9 right to manifest her religion and, 
even if it did, (2) the school's decision was objectively 
justified. I agree with the second reason. I am not so sure 
about the first. I think this may over-estimate the ease with 
which Shabina could move to another …school.” 22  
 
Baroness Hale said:  
 
“I too agree that this appeal should be allowed. Most of your 
Lordships take the view that Shabina Begum's right to 
 
20 R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School HL [2006] UKHL 15, [2006] All ER (D) 320 (Mar), (Approved judgment) 
para 20. 
21 Ibid at para 24. 
22 Ibid at para 41. 
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manifest her religion was not infringed because she had 
chosen to attend this school knowing full well what the 
school uniform was. It was she who had changed her mind 
about what her religion required of her, rather than the school, 
which had changed its policy. I am uneasy about this.” 23 
[And] “I am therefore inclined to agree with my noble and 
learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, that there was an 
interference with Shabina Begum's right to manifest her 
religion.”24
 
The House of Lords then went on to consider what constituted an 
interference within the meaning of art 9(2) and whether any interference was 
justified. In considering the matter of interference the House of Lords 
endeavoured to apply the Strasbourg jurisprudence in what they considered  
“a reasonable way”25 citing Kala v Turkey,26 which held: “Art 9 does not 
protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. Moreover, in 
exercising his freedom to manifest his religion, an individual may need to take 
his specific situation into account.”27 Applying too, Sahin v Turkey,28 and 
Ahmad v United Kingdom29 which held:  “. . . the freedom of religion, as 
guaranteed by Article 9, is not absolute, but subject to the limitations set out 
in Article 9(2). Moreover, it may, as regards the modality of a particular 
religious manifestation, be influenced by the situation of the person claiming 
that freedom.”30 Strasbourg jurisprudence on art 9 had engaged a wide range 
of issues and from several and very different European countries and in each 
case the court concluded that there had been no interference.31   
 
23 Ibid at para 92.   
24 Ibid at para 93. 
25 Ibid at para 25. 
26 (1997) 27 EHRR 552. 
27  HL at para 27. 
28 Application No 44774/98, 10 November 2005, unreported. Para 105. 
29 (1981) 4 EHRR 126, at para 11.   
30 HL at para 86. 
31 In Denmark, X v Denmark (1976) 5 DR 157, considered the question of  the right of 
clergyman to leave the church, and  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark 
(1976) 1 EHRR 711, considered parent’s religious objection to sex education. The 
UK case of  Ahmad v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 126, considered the  right of 
teachers to be asbent from school for prayers. In Konttinen v Finland (1996) 87-A DR 
68, the issues raised was whether working hours conflicted with religious convictions.  
In Valsamis v Greece (1996) 24 EHRR 294, a child who was a Jehovah’s witness who 
was punished for refusing to attend national day parade was held not to be an 
interference. In Karaduman v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 93, the applicant was denied a 
certificate of graduation because a photograph of her without a headscarf was 
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The House of Lords also considered the Court of Appeal’s criticism of 
this line of Strasbourg authority as “overly restrictive.” Lord Bingham 
responded by saying: 
 
 “Even if it be accepted that the Strasbourg institutions have 
erred on the side of strictness in rejecting complaints of 
interference, there remains a coherent and remarkably 
consistent body of authority which our domestic courts must 
take into account and which shows that interference is not 
easily established.” 32
 
The House of Lords accepted that interference was a debatable question 
“which gives the issue of justification under art 9(2) particular significance.”33 
Lord Bingham then went on to consider whether the school’s approach to the 
uniform question was justified. He said:  
 
“To be justified under art 9(2) a limitation or interference 
must be (a) prescribed by law and (b) necessary in a 
democratic society for a permissible purpose, that is, it must 
be directed to a legitimate purpose and must be proportionate 
in scope and effect, the issue is whether the rules and the 
school's insistence on them were in all the circumstances 
proportionate.” 34  
 
The House of Lords held the Court of Appeal’s approach to procedure to 
have been wrong and the House of Lords in its judgment referred to three 
academic articles which also shared this view35 and also to the fact that 
required and she was unwilling for religious reasons to be photographed without a 
headscarf. In Stedman v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168, there was no 
interference where an employee was free to resign rather than work on Sundays. In 
Jewish Liturgical Association Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France (2000) 9 BHRC 
27, para 81, also failed where the applicant’s  case was that ritual slaughter of meat in 
France did not meet religious requirements. In all the above cases no interference was 
established. 
32 HL at para 24. 
33 HL at para 25. 
34 HL at para 26. 
35 See Poole, "Of headscarves and heresies: The Denbigh High School case and public 
authority decision making under the Human Rights Act" [2005] PL 685; Linden and 
Hetherington, "Schools and Human Rights" [2005] Educational Law Journal 229; 
and, for a more controversial appraisal, Davies, "Banning the Jilbab: Reflections on 
Restricting Religious Clothing in the Light of the Court of Appeal in SB v Denbigh 
High School (2005) 1.3 European Constitutional Law Review 511. 
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shortly after the Court of Appeal judgement the Secretary of State intervened 
in order to correct what he described, as a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the Human Rights Act. And in so doing, Lord Bingham enumerated three 
reasons why he considered the Court of Appeal’s approach to the procedural 
question wrong. 
 
“First, the purpose of the Human Rights Act 1998 was not to 
enlarge the rights or remedies of those in the United Kingdom 
whose Convention rights have been violated but to enable 
those rights and remedies to be asserted and enforced by the 
domestic courts of this country… [30]. Secondly, it is clear 
that the court's approach to an issue of proportionality under 
the Convention must go beyond that traditionally adopted to 
judicial review in a domestic setting…[31]. Thirdly, … I 
consider that the Court of Appeal's approach would introduce 
"a new formalism" and be "a recipe for judicialisation on an 
unprecedented scale"……. But what matters in any case is 
the practical outcome, not the quality of the decision-making 
process that led to it.”36  
 
The House of Lords criticised the Court of Appeal’s approach to this 
procedural question and said that the importance of preserving an inclusive 
uniform and preserving harmony was a legitimate aim and the refusal of 
Shabina Begum’s request to wear the jilbab proportionate to that aim and 
justified. “The school was entitled to consider that the rules about uniform 




The House of Lords in this case was very careful in ruling that its finding 
applied to the Denbigh High School case and to no other.  
 
“ It is important to stress at the outset that this case concerns a 
particular pupil and a particular school in a particular place at 
a particular time. It must be resolved on facts, which are now, 
for purposes of the appeal, agreed. The House is not, and 
could not be, invited to rule whether Islamic dress, or any 
feature of Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in 
the schools of this country. That would be a most 
 
36 HL  at para 29. 
37 HL at para 58 per  Lord Hoffman. 
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inappropriate question for the House in its judicial capacity, 
and it is not one, which I shall seek to address.”38
 
The House of Lords decision clearly steers well clear of making any 
general rules with regard to school uniform and manifestation of religious 
belief. There is no need for future cases to follow the House of Lords or to 
distinguish or overrule. The House of Lords also avoided any discussion with 
regard to the meaning of  ‘manifestation’ and ‘observance’ in art 9(1) 
preferring to rely on the wording and approach of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. Although it is to be noted that the Strasbourg jurisprudence on 
the point of ‘dress code’ has considered ‘manifestation’ in a very specific 
context, relying on cases emanating from Turkey. Here, the particular social 
situation is coloured by the politico-religious and historical context of 
Turkey’s recent efforts towards modernity.  Begum’s social situation even 
taking into account the politico-historical context, that is, Islamic dress in the 
United Kingdom is a far, far, cry from Turkey’s history and struggle towards 
modernisation and its particular version of secularisation, which the Court of 
Appeal in contradistinction to the House of Lords found to be, putting it at its 
lowest, ‘overly restrictive’ and at its highest, prohibitive. 
Interestingly, the House of Lords was concerned with in Lord Bingham’s 
words practical outcomes in approaching the proportionality question. 
Nicholas Blake QC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) in R (Baker) v First 
Secretary of State39 characterised the process requirements as part of 
proportionality itself. “Proportionality is not simply whether at the end result 
the balance is fair, but whether, in getting there, it has been decided that the 
most appropriate course of conduct is also the least interfering with human 
rights, having regard to the public benefit to be achieved and the different 
means of achieving it.”  
The law has often been driven by consequences rather than by principle as 
Simon Lee has demonstrated40 and here, in this case, the consequences are set 
in a context of minority versus majority rights and a minority position that has 
been variously understood as ‘orthodox’, ‘extremist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ 
even though such language has been deliberately avoided by the courts. All 
courts, High Court, Appeal Court and House of Lords avoided any discussion 
of this question and their positionality on this issue was veiled in their 
eschewing of the use of terms like “moderate” or “extreme,” using instead the 
nomenclature of “very strong religious beliefs”41 explaining: “For the 
purposes of this judgment, because the epithet ‘fundamentalist’ has 
 
38 HL at para 2. 
39 [2003] EWHC 2511, [2004] JPL 729 (n 77). 
40 S. Lee Judging Judges, (London: Faber and Faber 1989). 
41 CA at 3376 para 8. 
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resonations which it would be inappropriate to carry into the discussion of the 
issues in this difficult case I will refer to those Muslims who believe that it is 
mandatory for women to wear the jilbab as ‘very strict Muslims’ and those 
Muslims who consider it inappropriate dress for a woman as ‘liberal Muslims’ 
While being conscious that experts might find these epithets equally 
inappropriate.”42
The balance between the rights of Shabina Begum and the rights and 
freedoms of others (Muslim girls and Muslim young women) came down on 
the side of protecting the rights of others (Muslim girls and Muslim young 
women) from coming under ‘any pressure’ from within or outside the school 
to wear the same form of dress as Shabina Begum wished to wear. This is an 
interesting logic to protect others from a particular pressure. If applied in the 
context of the everyday life, a similar argument would follow in respect of 
any religious group. It would be an argument applicable to the pressure real or 
imagined placed on Muslim girls and Muslim young women to wear the 
headscarf – the hijab – or indeed to wear the shalwar kameeze. The wearing 
of the headscarf one might argue has already marked out Muslim girls and 
Muslim young women one from another, in so far as hijab wearers might be 






















42 CA at 3381 para 33. 
43 Miss Booth QC’s point HL at para 65. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
